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HOW REINS WOULD IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
DAVID SCHOENBROD*
“A senior EPA executive, who has to remain nameless . . . thought a
concept like REINS was a great idea for two reasons . . . . [First] was
his unutterable frustration that the Congress often sends overly
generic or nonspecific or, in fact, many times contradictory titles in
bills. [Second was] that it would force a dialogue for clarity between
the agency [and Congress]. Instead of having 2,700-page bills that
show up hours before a vote, the dialogue could be ongoing, reduced
down to a concise piece of legislation that had very clear intent, very
clear expectations and metrics, and a clear outcome to maintain
context for our citizens.”
1

Representative Geoff Davis, March 14, 2011

Representative Davis’s report that a senior EPA executive
supports the concept behind REINS (short for “Regulations from the
2
Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act”) is hearsay from the bill’s chief
sponsor, and anonymous at that, but the reasons given for that
support correspond with the reasons that I gave for my support at the
Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum (DELPF) symposium
on January 24, 2011. In this essay, I explain my reasons for supporting
the substance of the bill, but also for disagreeing with some of its
rhetorical wrappings.
My argument that REINS would actually improve environmental
protection is a tough sell to environmentalists. After all, the bill
would shift power from the agencies to Congress, and Congress is
seen as the enemy. But the statutes that empower the agencies are
3
increasingly obsolete. There are limits on agencies’ ability to adapt

* Trustee Professor of Law, New York School of Law; Visiting Scholar, American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy; co-leader of the New York Law School and New York
University School of Law project, Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New
Congress and Administration. I am grateful for helpful comments to the participants in this
symposium, the advice of Tracy Mehan, and the excellent research assistance of Justin Sherman,
New York Law School class of 2011.
1. 157 CONG. REC. H1785 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2011).
2. H.R. 10, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 299, 112th Cong. (2011).
3. That the statutes are obsolescent and need updating is the overall point of DAVID
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them to deal effectively with old, unsolved problems and newer ones
4
such as climate change. The need to update these statutes will only
grow in time. Meanwhile, Congress keeps sticking its nose in through
the oversight, appointments, and budget processes. REINS would
give Congress a more direct sort of control, but this control would
come at the expense of legislators having to take direct responsibility
for decisions to impose or not impose specific regulations. That is the
first step towards a more constructive approach to our environmental
problems.
***
William Reilly, an excellent EPA administrator and thoughtful
presence throughout the DELPF symposium, invoked an image of
ticking hand grenades to describe the politically charged statutory
duties that George W. Bush’s EPA had failed to fulfill and thus left to
5
Barack Obama’s EPA: “They’re like little hand grenades that have
been rolled out there by previous administrators, and now they’re
6
ticking.” Mr. Reilly’s analogy is apt but incomplete. W’s presidential
administration was far from the first to roll hand grenades to its
successor. His EPA was on the receiving end of grenades rolled to it
7
by the EPA of his predecessor, William Clinton. Indeed, presidents

SCHOENBROD, RICHARD B. STEWART & KATRINA M. WYMAN, BREAKING THE LOGJAM:
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THAT WILL WORK (2010).
4. For example, the Clean Air Act inhibits EPA’s ability to use market-based approaches
to interstate air pollution. David Schoenbrod, The Clean Air Act Is in No Shape to Be
Celebrated, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2010, 12:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/davidschoenbrod/the-clean-air-act-is-in-n_b_704631.html.
5. Gabriel Nelson, EPA: Previous Administrators Handed Rulemaking ‘Grenades’ to
Obama – William Reilly, E & E PUBLISHING (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/
public/Greenwire/print/2010/12/17/1; Gabriel Nelson, Previous EPA Administrators Handed
Rulemaking ‘Grenades’ to Obama, William Reilly Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2010), http://
www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/12/17/17greenwire-previous-epa-administrators-handedrulemaking-g-7635.html [hereinafter Previous].
6. Id.
7. For example, the EPA was sued in 1989, under Bush I, to revise its regulations on
water pollution from Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations. But, it was not until the very
last days of the Clinton administration, more than eight years later, and after the 2008 elections,
that the Clinton EPA even issued proposed regulations on this touchy subject, The result was
that the ultimate decision was left to the Bush II EPA. Waterkeeper Alliance v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 399 F.3d 486, 494–95 (2d Cir. 2005). The Clinton administration did issue long overdue
regulations on arsenic in drinking water, but did not get around to making this politically
explosive decision until after the November 2000 elections. National Primary Drinking Water
Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants
Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22, 2001). How convenient! As a result, the decision was
not final when George W. Bush took office and therefore his EPA had to decide whether to let
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have been rolling environmental hand grenades to their successors
since the EPA was established.
The prime roller is Congress. Congress rolled ticking hand
grenades by imposing deadlines to issue regulations without regard to
whether the EPA could meet them. So the great bulk of deadlines go
8
unmet under presidents of both parties. One forty-year veteran of a
major EPA program was heard to say, “I can count on one hand the
number of major regulations issued without a court-ordered
9
deadline.”
Congress also rolled ticking hand grenades by requiring the EPA
to achieve environmental quality goals without regard to whether
they could be achieved through steps palatable to the legislators
themselves. In the 1970 Clean Air Act, for example, Congress
mandated that the EPA achieve air quality goals that could be met
only by choking the supply of gasoline to Southern California,
banning cars and trucks during business hours from the business
10
district of Manhattan, and more.
Congress thus sets up the EPA for abuse from the legislators no
matter what the agency does. If the EPA takes politically unpopular
steps, legislators can chastise it for the burdens imposed on their
constituents. If the EPA fails to achieve statutory goals, the legislators
can chastise it for failing to protect their constituents. In sum,
Congress has designed the environmental statutes to provide “a
handy set of mirrors—so useful in Washington—by which a politician
11
can appear to kiss both sides of the apple,” as John Quarles (EPA’s
first general counsel and later its deputy administrator) put it.
The conflicted behavior of Congress reflects, in turn, the
conflicted desires of the American people, whom William
Ruckelshaus (twice EPA administrator) recently described as
12
“ideological liberals and operational conservatives.” However, the
legislators cannot justify their apple-kissing behavior by pointing to
the conflicted desires of their constituents because the Constitution

the arsenic regulations take effect. The Bush EPA’s decision not to let the regulations take
effect blew up in the administration’s face. DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT
FROM WASHINGTON 169–80 (2005).
8. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of
Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1991).
9. Courtesy precludes attribution.
10. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 39–51 (2005).
11. John Quarles, A Thicket of Environmental Laws, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1979, at 10.
12. See Previous, supra note 5.
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assigns to Congress the job of resolving the constituents’ conflicting
desires. Congress is where representatives of all the people’s
conflicting interests are supposed to congregate to make the hard
13
choices before acting. Instead, Congress generally designs its
environmental statutes so that the hard choices blow up in the face of
agencies.
One way to get Congress to do its job is for the courts to enforce
14
the non-delegation doctrine. But whether courts should do so, they
15
won’t.
Another way to get Congress to do its job, as James Landis (the
New Deal’s sage of administrative law) suggested, is for agencies to
present their regulations to Congress for approval. He wrote, “It was
an act of political wisdom to put back upon the shoulders of
16
Congress” responsibility for controversial choices.
Judge (now Justice) Stephen Breyer has explained how
congressional vetting of agency regulations could work in practice.
Congress could enact a statute that first, bars agency regulations from
going into effect unless confirmed through the United States
Constitution’s Article I legislative process, and second, establishes a
fast-track process that would require the legislators to accept or reject
17
the regulations by a deadline.
Deadlines on Congress would be poetic justice.
REINS would implement Justice Breyer’s scheme for the most
important regulations.

13. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison).
14. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993).
15. See generally Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (rejecting the D.C.
Circuit’s finding that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated authority to the EPA to set
ambient air quality standards based on human health.). For discussion of the reasons for this
refusal, see David Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle that Elected Legislators Should Make
the Laws, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239 (2002).
16. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 76 (1938).
17. Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 793–94 (1984)
(writing about how Congress could retrieve the power it lost when the Supreme Court struck
down the legislative veto in I.N.S v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). Breyer also commented on
the wisdom of providing a Congressional check to agency power. Id. at 796–98. On the latter
question, it is interesting to consider Justice Breyer’s likely response to William F. Buckley’s
famous statement that “I should sooner live in a society governed by the first two thousand
names in the Boston telephone directory than in a society governed by the two thousand faculty
members of Harvard University.” William F. Buckley, speaking in 1963, as quoted in RALPH
KEYES, THE QUOTE VERIFIER: WHO SAID WHAT, WHERE, AND WHEN 82–83 (2006).
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***
I have supported the concept behind REINS since I was a
beginning academic still doing some litigation for the Natural
18
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in the very early 1980s.
Indeed, that support grew out of my experience as a principal
attorney at NRDC through most of the 1970s.
One of my tasks at NRDC was to head the campaign of
environmental and anti-poverty organizations to protect children
19
20
from lead in gasoline. Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1970
because the public demanded protection; the pollution that worried
voters most came from lead in gasoline. Lead was known to poison
21
children. The bumper stickers read: “GET THE LEAD OUT.”
In the 1970 legislation, Congress did take responsibility for a rule
that would eventually reduce lead exposure, but not to protect
children. The act authorized the EPA to require that new cars made
22
from 1975 onward use only lead-free gas. The reason was that
Congress had decided that auto manufacturers must, from 1975
23
onwards, include pollution-controlling devices in their cars. The
device of choice, the catalytic converter, cut many pollutants, but not
24
lead—in fact, lead would ruin it. For Congress to require motorists
to pay for the device and then let it be ruined by leaded gas would
look foolish.
Legislators could not tell voters in 1970 that this rule to protect
pollution control devices and their own reputations was sufficient to
protect children from lead. Children would still be exposed to lead
from gasoline for many years after 1970. The rule would not even
25
take effect until the 1975 cars became available. Even then, pre-1975
18. See David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act,
30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 804, 807 (1983) (arguing that agencies should be required to propose any
new rules to Congress for legislative consideration).
19. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 29–38.
20. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
21. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 29.
22. See Clean Air Amendments §§ 202(a)–(b) (authorizing the EPA to establish emissions
standards for “any air pollutant from . . . new motor vehicles . . . which . . . endangers the public
health or welfare.”); id. § 211 (authorizing the EPA to regulate fuel additives that “endanger the
public health”).
23. Id. § 202(b)(1)(A); id. § 211(authorizing the EPA to regulate fuel additives).
24. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 34.
25. See Clean Air Amendments §§ 202(b)(1)(A)–(B) (requiring that vehicles
manufactured in model years 1975 and later meet emissions standards for carbon monoxide and
hydrocarbons).
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cars would still use leaded gas, and in 1975, there would be roughly
26
100 million such cars on the road using leaded gas. Many of them
would remain there into the 1980s.
So Congress in 1970 had to do more to satisfy voters’ demand to
protect children from lead. But lawmakers could not simply ban
leaded gasoline forthwith; voters also wanted cheap gasoline, and
27
adding lead reduces slightly the cost of refining it. Congress was
caught between voters’ demand to protect children and voters’ desire
to keep gas cheap.
When Congress is faced with a controversial choice, it often
enacts a two-step plan sure to produce ticking hand grenades. It (1)
announces a lofty goal, but (2) orders an agency to achieve the goal,
thus letting the agency take the heat for failing to achieve it or for the
painful steps necessary to achieve it. Congress rolled a grenade with
lead. Congress (1) decided that a health-based air quality standard for
lead must be achieved by May 1976 and (2) ordered EPA to establish
28
the rules to achieve that standard by the deadline.
After passing the statute, diverse members of Congress—
Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives—lobbied the
EPA, often on the quiet, to do nothing about the leaded gasoline used
29
by the pre-1975 cars. Other members complained about the failure
30
to protect health and encouraged the EPA to act. As often happens
when an agency is caught in such a cross fire, the EPA went into a
31
stall.
In late 1972, my colleagues and I at the Natural Resources
Defense Council won a decision against the EPA that prompted it, at
last, to issue a rule to reduce the amount of lead in gasoline used in
32
33
the pre-1975 cars. This victory was followed by others. Yet, those
26. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 34.
27. Id. at 34–35.
28. See Clean Air Amendments §§ 108(a)(1)–(2), 109(a)–(b), 110(a)(1)–(2).
29. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 31 (“[L]egislators in Congress, including liberal
Democrats with industry connections, urged the EPA to go slow on lead.”).
30. See id. at 30.
31. See id. at 31.
32. Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), aff’g NRDC
v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 72-2233 (U.S. App. D.C. 1973) (directing the EPA to reach a final
decision within thirty days regarding whether to regulate lead additives).
33. See, e.g., Nat. Resource s Def. Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir. 1976)
(holding that EPA lacked the discretion to not issue air quality standards for lead under the
1970 Clean Air Amendments); Lead Indus. Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency , 647 F.2d 1130
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that EPA decisions to regulate lead based on available scientific
evidence were not arbitrary and capricious).

Schoenbrod_122011 (Do Not Delete)

12/22/2011 1:37 PM

Spring 2011] HOW REINS WOULD IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

353

victories in the courts did not translate into any reductions in lead in
the air for many years. In fact, the amount of lead emitted from motor
34
vehicles actually increased slightly from 1970 to 1975. Meanwhile,
the May 1976 deadline to protect health was approaching.
When Jimmy Carter was elected president in 1976, I hoped that
his tough campaign talk about the environment would translate into
tough action on lead. To the contrary, President Carter eventually
ordered the EPA to weaken the already weak lead reduction
35
schedule his Republican predecessors had adopted.
Lead in gasoline began to decline in the late 1970s, primarily
because the pre-1975 cars were being replaced by new cars that could
use only unleaded gasoline, rather than because of anything the EPA
36
was doing to protect health. By the mid-1980s, so many older cars
had been taken off the road that the major oil companies found it
37
unprofitable to continue producing and distributing leaded gasoline.
But they did not want to lose market share to smaller refiners who
still sold leaded gas, so Big Oil lobbied Ronald Reagan’s EPA to ban
38
lead additives on the grounds that they are dangerous to health. The
39
agency complied. EPA finally got tough on lead, but only after
powerhouse oil companies watching their bottom lines got involved.
If Congress in 1970 could not have passed the buck to the EPA
on the hard choices on protecting health from lead, Congress would
still have had to do something in response to the popular demand to
protect the children. Congress would have had to enact a rule cutting
lead in gasoline, but that rule would have been a compromise, getting
rid of more than half of the lead over the next several years with
40
further reductions to come. After all, in the same statute, Congress
had required the powerful auto industry to reduce emissions of three
41
pollutants other than lead by ninety percent by 1975.
The reason that Congress did not enact a rule to cut lead in 1970
is that legislators would have been criticized on two fronts: by voters

34. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT,
1970 –1990 app. G-33 (1997) [hereinafter BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT].
35. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 33.
36. SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 35.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Regulation of Fuel and Fuel Additives; Gasoline Lead Content, 40 C.F.R. pt. 80
(1985).
40. SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 35–36.
41. Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 202(a)–(b) (2006).
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who wanted all the lead out right away and by other voters upset by a
42
small rise in gas prices. So, instead of enacting such a law, which
would have been good for the American people, legislators enacted a
statute avoiding responsibility, which was perfect for them.
The upshot is that lead came out of gasoline much more slowly
than if Congress itself had made the hard choice. As a result, massive
numbers of children, especially inner-city children, died and/or had
43
their IQs reduced below seventy. Using EPA data on the health
effects of lead in gasoline, I estimate that the deaths and permanent
impairments due to Congress’s evasion of responsibility are on the
44
scale of American casualties in the War in Vietnam.
***
45

As a result of this experience at NRDC, I published an article
46
and then, in 1993, a book arguing that Congress should take ultimate
responsibility for the regulations from the EPA and other agencies.
Representative J.D. Hayworth asked me to help draft a bill to
47
promote responsibility by Congress. I proposed basing the bill on
Judge Breyer’s idea; the resulting bill was called the Congressional
48
Responsibility Act. Congress imitated the name for a watered-down
49
version that it did enact, the Congressional Review Act. It gave the
legislators the option of taking responsibility for regulations, while
the Congressional Responsibility Act would have forced them to take
50
responsibility. Needless to say, legislators hardly ever opt to take
51
responsibility under the Congressional Review Act.

42. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 34–35.
43. See BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 34, at app. G-34; see
also Richard L. Canfield et al., Intellectual Impairment in Children with Blood Lead
Concentration Below 10 µg per Deciliter, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1517 (2003) (finding that an
increase in blood lead levels from 1 to 10 µg per deciliter results in a 7.4-point decrease in IQ,
with each 10 µg increase above 10 µg resulting in an additional 4.6-point decrease in IQ).
44. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 35–38.
45. Schoenbrod, supra note 18.
46. SCHOENBROD, supra note 14.
47. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 162–63.
48. Congressional Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 2727, 104th Cong. (1995).
49. Congressional Review Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 801–808).
50. In particular, the Congressional Review Act creates a fast track process for rejecting a
newly issued agency regulation through the legislative process, 5 U.S.C. § 802, while the
Congressional Responsibility Act would prevent a regulation from going into effect unless
approved through a fast track legislative process, H.R. 2727 at § 3.
51. The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2163 (2009).
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Now in 2011, the House of Representatives will likely vote on
52
REINS, which is modeled on the Congressional Responsibility Act.
Like the Congressional Responsibility Act, the new bill would
implement Judge Breyer’s concept; but unlike it, the new bill would
53
be limited to “major” regulations. These are defined chiefly as
regulations that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) finds
54
to have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more. In
particular, such major regulations would not go into effect until
55
confirmed through the legislative process. The bill imposes deadlines
requiring up or down votes in the House and the Senate within thirty
56
legislative days after its introduction.
Although the germ of the idea behind the bill can be traced back
to a champion of New Deal-era administrative law, the current bill’s
sponsors herald it with language that can be understood as antiagency and anti-regulation. For example, the title, Regulations from
the Executive in Need of Scrutiny, suggests agencies are the source of
the problem. Yet it was Congress, often with broad bipartisan
support, which imposed the deadlines and duties on the agencies and
57
authorized the courts to make sure the agencies complied. Also,

52. See Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act, H.R. 10, 112th Cong.
(2011); S. 299, 112th Cong. (2011).
53. H.R. 10 at § 801(a)(3). There is a limited exception to the requirements of the Act for
monetary policy. H.R. 10 at § 806.
54. H.R. 10 at § 804(2).
55. H.R. 10 at §§ 801(a)(3), 803; cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 7.
56. H.R. 10 §§ 802(c), 802(e)(1); S. 299 §§ 802(c), 802(e)(1).
57. In her testimony before the Subcommittee on Courts, Commercial, and Administrative
Law, Sally Katzen explained, “agencies are not free agents . . . they can only issue regulations
that implement existing law—that is, laws that are duly enacted (passed by both Houses of
Congress and signed by the President).” The REINS Act—Promoting Jobs and Expanding
Freedom by Reducing Needless Regulations: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3 (2011)
(statement of Sally Katzen, Visiting Professor NYU School of Law and Senior Advisor of the
Podesta Group) [hereinafter Katzen Statement]. The rhetoric surrounding REINS also does a
disservice by posing the problem as controlling agencies when it is really making Congress
accountable. Professor Katzen rightly notes that there are existing procedural safeguards that
help restrain agencies. She explains that the Administrative Procedure Act “generally requires
that agencies give notice of what they intend to do, along with their supporting data and
analysis,” and provide people with “a meaningful opportunity . . . to comment” on the proposed
agency action. Id.; see also Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat.
237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). Furthermore, the agency that
proposes the rule “respond[s] to significant comments, explaining whether (and why) they agree
or disagree with the comments received.” Katzen Statement, supra. None of the procedures now
in place accomplishes what the REINS act would: force Congress to take responsibility.
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some sponsors argue in support of the bill by deploring the cost of
regulation, without noting that the benefits can be much greater than
58
the costs. Indeed, some regulations enjoy wide congressional
59
support.
This rhetoric is, however, a passing thing and the bill’s title can
be readily changed. A Wall Street Journal editorial called it by a more
60
apt name, “The Congressional Accountability Act.” Thoughtful
people will focus on substance that would endure if the bill is passed
rather than the rhetoric.
***
Let us start by considering some concerns that might be voiced
by a hypothetical critic.
Concern: “Legislators are much less knowledgeable than agency
experts.” But the bill would marry fact development by experts with
political responsibility by elected politicians. Under REINS, the
agency would, as James Landis put it, continue to be “the technical
agent in the initiation of rules of conduct, yet at the same time . . .
have [the elected lawmakers] share in the responsibility for their
61
adoption.”
Concern: “Regulations will be filibustered.” But REINS limits
debate on the confirmatory vote and all related motions to two hours
62
in each house.

58. See Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Hold the REINS: Regulations
Generate Major Economic Benefits, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 18, 2011), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-l-revesz-and-michael-a-livermore/hold-the-reinsregulation_b_804211.html (arguing that regulations can produce billions of dollars in net
benefits).
59. See generally Katzen Statement, supra note 57. Christopher Demuth expanded upon
the same point in testimony before Congress. “Environmental initiatives are often highly
popular, and EPA, beset as it always is by interest groups whose métier is exaggeration and
alarmism, may find it difficult to see past the lobbying fog: it may underestimate as well as
overestimate popular support in a way that constituency-minded legislators would not.”
Environmental Regulations, the Economy, and Jobs: Before the Subcomm. on Env’t and the
Econ. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 10 (statement of Christopher
DeMuth, D.C. Searle Senior Fellow, Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research).
60. The Congressional Accountability Act: A Proposal to Ban Regulation Without
Representation,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
14,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203525404576049703586223080.html.
61. LANDIS, supra note 16, at 76. E. Donald Elliot makes a related point in calling for
Congress to get expert help in crafting statutes: “The function of Congress is not to devise
solutions to complex technocratic problems, but to provide democratic legitimacy.”
SCHOENBROD, STEWART & WYMAN, supra note 3, at 122.
62. Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act, H.R. 10, 112th Cong. §§
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However, Professor Sidney Shapiro accuses the drafters of
REINS of pulling a fast one. He argues that the “motion to proceed”
to the confirmatory vote would be separately debatable and therefore
63
could be filibustered.
But, REINS is an amendment to the
Congressional Review Act and under it motions to proceed are
debatable when they are to proceed to a time-limited matter: Then
64
they are not debatable. Any legislator who still sees some way there
could be a filibuster should propose an amendment to foreclose the
possibility.
Concern: “Congress lacks the time to vote on agency
65
regulations.” But, during the 111th Congress, agencies promulgated
66
130 significant interim final rules and final rules. One way to put this
in perspective is that during the same Congress, the legislators
enacted over eighty public laws naming post offices, federal buildings,
67
and other lands. These naming bills take much less time than would

802(d)(2), 802(e)(2)(B) (2011).
63. Sidney Shapiro, CPR Backgrounder: The REINS Act: The Conservative Push to
Undercut Regulatory Protections for Health, Safety, and the Environment, CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE
REFORM,
available
at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/
CPR_Reins_Act_Backgrounder.pdf.
64. RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31160, DISAPPROVAL OF
REGULATIONS BY CONGRESS: PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 12
(2001).
The Congressional Review Act omits one other provision that appears in many
expedited procedures for taking up resolutions of disapproval. The Act does not
explicitly make the disapproval resolution privileged. It is established Senate practice
that a motion to proceed to consider a matter is debatable (and, therefore, subject to
filibuster) unless the matter in question is privileged. Senate precedents, however,
indicate that if a statute established a time limit for the consideration of a specified
measure, the provision has the effect of rendering the measure privileged, so that a
motion to proceed to its consideration is not debatable. Consistent with this principle,
the Senate has treated a motion to consider a disapproval resolution under the
Congressional Review Act as not debatable, even though the Act does not explicitly
bar the debate. Id.
In theory, the Senate could amend its rules to allow filibusters under REINS. But, according to
Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the United States Senate, cloture is barred on a debate on a
motion to change the Senate rules unless two-thirds of the senator’s present and voting vote for
cloture. The Senate has never amended its rules without complying with pre-existing rules.
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41342, PROPOSALS TO CHANGE
THE
OPERATION OF CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 4–6 (2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41342.pdf.
65. See Ezra Klein, The Reins Act, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2011, 10:16 AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost/ezra-klein/2011/02/the_rein_act.html.
66. Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, REGINFO.GOV, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
(follow “Regulatory Review: Search” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
67. Library of Cong., Public Laws of the 111th Congress, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/
home/LegislativeData.php?&n=PublicLaws&c=111 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
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deciding whether to confirm an agency regulation, even though the
agency already crafted the regulation, developed a record, and
evaluated its impacts and the time for debate is strictly limited. The
relevance of the naming bills is that they typify numerous ways in
which legislators spend a great deal of their time taking symbolic
stances. Enacting REINS would be a decision to spend more time
taking responsibility for hard and real choices about the regulations
that protect and bind their constituents. These regulations are laws.
Major regulations are major laws. The elected lawmakers in Congress
should put taking responsibility for the major laws ahead of taking
symbolic stances. As Representative Davis characterized the view of
his senior EPA executive, Congress would vote on “a concise piece of
legislation that had very clear intent, very clear expectations and
metrics, and a clear outcome to maintain context for our citizens,”
68
rather than an amorphous, sprawling, feel-good bill.
Quorum calls, roll calls, and other legislative business could well
mean that considering each major rule could take a good bit more
than two hours. If the time for considering all the major rules is too
great in Congress’s judgment, it should raise the criteria for a major
rule above $100 million rather than abdicate responsibility for the
most significant laws altogether.
Concern: “REINS is designed to stop the Obama administration
from promulgating regulations.”
Representative Steve Cohen
observed in the hearings on REINS that such an act was not even
considered until President Obama became president, suggesting that
the real motive for REINS was to disempower the Obama
69
administration rather than to promote accountability. But, contrary
to Representative Cohen’s assertion, Republicans introduced the
Congressional Responsibility Act, which goes further than REINS,
70
when George W. Bush was in the White House. There is no doubt,
however, that regulatory initiatives under President Obama have
spurred on the Republicans. Yet, this is beside the point: he and
Democrats in the Senate could exact, as a price for enacting the bill,
an amendment to postpone the effective date of the bill until the start
of the next presidential term. That way, Congress could make itself

68. 157 CONG. REC. H1785 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2011) (statement of Rep. Davis,
paraphrasing “senior EPA executive”).
69. See Reins Act—Promoting Jobs And Expanding Freedom By Reducing Needless
Regulations: Hearing on H.R.10 Before Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial and Admin. Law of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112 Cong. 100 (2011) (statement of Rep. Steve Cohen).
70. See, e.g., H.R. 110, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2010).
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accountable without reducing the powers that the people elected a
sitting president to execute. The bill’s Republican sponsors should
agree because they would be hard pressed to get the bill enacted
before then.
Concern: “Congress is irresponsible.” Even if Congress is the
most irresponsible branch, the status quo makes matters worse by
leaving the hard choices to one of the most unaccountable parts of
government—agencies, which are subject to backdoor influence from
legislators who can avoid having to take public responsibility for how
they use their influence. REINS gets to the root of the responsibility
problem. Congress is irresponsible because the legislators have
contrived to wiggle out of the responsibility that the Constitution
71
assigns to them. REINS would force legislators to assume
responsibility for regulating or not regulating through highly visible
votes for or against major regulations. Agencies too would get their
say by framing the regulations on which Congress would vote. The
upshot would be a more responsible Congress, accountability for
regulations, and expert input.
The upshot would also be better environmental protection. Here
is why.
***
On the environment, Congress is bipolar. The right vilifies the
left as crazy ideologues, and the left vilifies the right as greedy
ignoramuses. When the right does well in an election, as it did in 1994,
it projects its success into the future and acts as if it can run
roughshod over the left. Back then, the Republicans came to grief for
their environmental proposals, most significantly a proposal to bar
72
agency regulations that failed to meet a cost-benefit test. As
Professor Richard Lazarus explains, voters “responded with such
hostility to [the Republican proposals that their] legislative reform
73
effort was effectively sapped of its political viability.” The behavior

71. See generally SCHOENBROD, supra note 14 (arguing that the Constitution was
designed to make Congress take responsibility for lawmaking, but that Congress has ducked
that responsibility by delegating even the most fundamental choices about the laws).
72. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 129 (2004).
73. Id. at 131.
Somewhat ironically, the executive branch under Clinton used the same tactics against
Congress that Congress had used against the Nixon, Reagan, and Bush administrations
during the 1970s and 1980s. Just as Congress had effectively exploited the public’s
distrust of government to defeat earlier retreats from environmental protection, so did
the Clinton administration block Congress in the 1990s. President Clinton, Vice
President Al Gore, EPA administrator Carol Browner, and Interior Secretary Bruce
Babbitt repeatedly characterized Congress as seeking to undermine public health and
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of the left in many ways mirrors that of the right with the result that
the victory in 2008 turned to the defeat in 2010.
Whether there is a moral equivalence between the behavior of
the left and right, the result is erratic swings in the attitudes of the
majority in Congress towards environmental protection. Here is how
William Ruckelshaus put it in 1995 at a time when Republicans saw
nothing but glory before them.
We recognize, as perhaps the newer members of Congress do not,
that the current rhetorical excess is yet another phase in a
dismaying pattern. The anti-environmental push of the nineties is
prompted by the pro-environmental excess of the late eighties,
which was prompted by the anti-environmental excess of the early
eighties, which was prompted by the pro-environmental excess of
the seventies, which was prompted. . . . But why go on? The pattern
is quite clear. The new Congress may believe that it is the vanguard
of a permanent change in attitude toward regulation, but unless the
past is no longer prologue, the pendulum will swing back, and we
74
will see a new era of pro-environmental movement in the future.

Ruckelshaus concludes that these wild swings have a devastating
75
impact on EPA’s ability to act sensibly.
To modulate the bipolar politics, what has to come, as New York
Times columnist David Brooks recently put it, “is a sense of humility,
that the reason people behave civilly to one another is because, alone,
no one has the resources to really conduct an intelligent policy, that
76
you need the conversation, you need the back-and-forth.” Brooks
was speaking about the aftermath of the shooting of Representative
Gabrielle Giffords, but his statement applies fully to environmental
protection.
REINS would force a “dialogue” between the EPA and
Congress, as the senior EPA executive whom Representative Davis
quoted put it. Centrist legislators would be the ones most apt to
converse, and their conversation would pressure those on the left and
right to join in. Republicans and Democrats will resist stereotypical
environmental quality for the sake of industry profits. The U.S. public responded with
such hostility to any proposed change that the legislative reform effort was effectively
sapped of its political viability. Id.
74. William D. Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, ENVTL. F., Nov.–Dec. 1995, at 26, 26;
see also Cristine Russell, Bill Ruckelshaus on EPA: “Battered Agency Syndrome?”, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 4, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/12/billruckelshaus-on-epa-battered-agency-syndrome/67501/.
75. Ruckelshaus, supra note 74, at 26.
76. PBS Newshour: Shields and Brooks On Obama’s Tucson Speech, Calls for Political
Civility (PBS television broadcast Jan. 14, 2011), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/politics/jan-june11/shieldsbrooks_01-14.html.
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reactions to environmental regulations, or voters will punish them at
the polls. That is how we should get to sensible outcomes in a
democracy, not by hiding behind unelected agency officials.
Representative Hank Johnson argued at the hearings on REINS
that the bill would shift the political balance in favor of corporations
because they could afford to make large contributions to members of
77
Congress. This is a one-sided view that appeals to a naïve
understanding of regulatory politics. The money of businesses speaks
loudly in Congress, but it also speaks loudly in the agency rulemaking
process, both by paying for lawyers and experts to mount arguments
to the agency and also for contributions to legislators to get them to
pressure the agency. Besides, in politics, votes trump money, and
when it comes to mobilizing voters, environmental interests have real
78
strengths. REINS would shift final authority on regulations from the
offices of agencies to the floor of Congress where legislators would
have to stand up and be counted in plain view of their constituents.
Experience shows that environmental interests often fare better
when Congress makes the hard choices. The most striking advances
under the Clean Air Act have come when Congress did take
responsibility. For example, as discussed above, Congress in 1970
took responsibility for requiring auto manufacturers to cut emissions
from new autos by ninety percent. Then, in 1990, Congress took
responsibility for requiring power plants to cut sulfur emissions by
79
fifty percent and for completely phasing out stratospheric ozone
80
destroying chemicals. In contrast, where Congress left responsibility
for the hard choices to the EPA, as it did with lead in gasoline, the
public often suffers. Similarly, when Congress passed the buck on
hazardous air pollutants in 1970, the agency went into a stall and was
unable to deal with the great bulk of them for twenty years until
81
Congress acted in 1990. As Professor Dan Farber has noted, the
idealistic goals that Congress told EPA to achieve in making its laws

77. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 10
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial, and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 151–52 (2011), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
printers/112th/112-26_65074.PDF.
78. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 134-35 (discussing those strengths).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 7651(d) (2006); see also SCHOENBROD, STEWART & WYMAN, supra note 3,
at 7.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 7671(c) (making the production of class I ozone-depleting substances
unlawful after January 1, 2000); id. § 7671(d) (making the production of class II ozone-depleting
substances unlawful after January 1, 2030).
81. SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 50.
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82

actually prevented sensible steps to reduce pollution.
REINS would also improve environmental regulation by giving
legislators, at long last, a personal stake in updating their obsolete
environmental statutes. The basic structure of most key
83
environmental statutes dates back thirty or forty years. Experience
has shown that the statutes force the EPA to regulate in ways that are
84
often ineffective and inefficient. The inefficacy and inefficiency
forced by obsolete statutes are a problem for the environment and
the economy, but not for the legislators who can now blame the
shortcomings on the EPA and other agencies. The upshot is a logjam
in updating our obsolete environmental laws.
This logjam gave rise to Breaking the Logjam, a project which
85
has proposed how to update the environmental statutes. The leaders
of the project—Richard B. Stewart, Katrina M. Wyman, and myself—
have had diverse experiences in the environmental field. We brought
together fifty equally diverse environmental law experts to propose
and reflect upon ways to modernize a wide spectrum of federal
86
environmental statutes. The undertaking was built upon four
principles: (1) to adopt market-based tools wherever they can reliably
achieve environmental goals; (2) to realign the responsibilities of the
federal government and the states so that each level has more
effective power over the environmental problems it is best placed to
address; (3) to face trade-offs openly and based on reliable
information; and (4) to use cross-cutting regulatory approaches that
87
address closely related problems together rather than separately.

82. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 73 (1999). See also STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1995).
83. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 88 (codified as
amended in 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 to 1544 (2006)); Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91
Stat. 1566 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.); National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321,
4331 to 4335, 4341 to 4374 (2006)); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat.
1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
84. See SCHOENBROD, STEWART & WYMAN, supra note 3, at 19–28.
85. The Breaking the Logjam project has issued a report and a book offering detailed
suggestions for updating the environmental statutes. Id.; see also DAVID SCHOENBROD,
RICHARD B. STEWART & KATRINA M. WYMAN, FINAL REPORT: BREAKING THE LOGJAM
(2009),
http://www.breakingthelogjam.org/CMS/files/
39611235964787FACDBreakingLogjamReportfinal.pdf
86. SCHOENBROD, STEWART & WYMAN, supra note 3, at xiv to xviii (listing symposium
participants).
87. Id. at xii to xiv (describing the Breaking the Logjam project).
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At the end of a four-year process, the leaders of the project
published a book that includes proposals to update many
environmental statutes. Take the proposal to restructure the Clean
88
Air Act. It is based on the most successful programs for regulating
air pollution—those dealing with new vehicles, lead in gasoline, acid
rain, and ozone-destroying chemicals. To emulate the key
characteristics of those programs, the proposal recommends that
Congress regulate the sources rather than the states, decide how
much to cut pollution and how to allocate the cleanup burden, and
use market-based mechanisms to give sources flexibility in making
89
the cuts. This implements the project’s first principle. To keep the
new program to manageable proportions, it should not attempt to
regulate all sources. Rather, as the second principle suggests, it should
cover only the biggest sources—new vehicles, fuels, and several
90
thousand of the largest stationary sources. Together these account
91
for the lion’s share of controllable emissions. The remaining
stationary sources, which are large in number but small in emissions
relative to those that would be federally controlled, would be left to
the states, which would be largely freed from the state
92
implementation plan requirement.
The proposal calls for the direct federal controls to mostly take
93
the form of cap-and-trade. Congress should set the caps to decline
over time and determine the method of distributing the allowances.
The reformed statute should establish backstops to remedy failure of
the federal cap-and-trade system to perform as expected: backsliding
by states or harmful interstate spillovers, hot spots, or shortfalls in
94
achieving National Ambient Air Quality Standards.
The proposal downgrades the state implementation plans as the
means to achieve the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
because experience and changing circumstances have made those
plans dysfunctional. An increasing proportion of pollution is
95
interstate, even international. A 2004 National Research Council
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 73–98.
Id. at 86–87.
Id. at 89–91.
Id. at 90.
See id. at 89, 92.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 92, 97.
CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY & 350.ORG, PETITION TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL
POLLUTION LIMITS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES PURSUANT TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT 29–30
(2008),
available
at
www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/global_
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study concludes that the rigidity and procedural complexity of the
state implementation plan process hobbles pollution-control efforts.
The process
now mandates extensive amounts of . . . time and resources in a
legalistic, and often frustrating, proposal and review process, which
focuses primarily on compliance with intermediate process steps.
This process probably discourages innovation and experimentation
at the state and local levels; overtaxes the limited financial and
human resources available to the nation’s [Air Quality
Management] system at the state, local, and federal levels; and
draws attention and resources away from the more germane issue
96
of ensuring progress towards the goal of meeting the NAAQS.

Our proposal would require legislators to take responsibility for
choosing how fast to cut pollution and how to allocate costs. They do
not want this responsibility, but REINS would give it to them anyway.
The legislators would then have a personal stake in updating the
environmental statutes so that Congress has more sensible regulations
upon which to vote.
To sum up, REINS would generate a “dialogue” between EPA
and Congress and create incentives for legislators to face up to
obsolescence of our old environmental statutes. These effects would
in turn induce changes in how Congress delegates to agencies.
Knowing that they would have to take responsibility for the
important regulations, legislators would order the agency to shape
regulations to achieve standards based upon compromise, rather than,
as now, to achieve purist standards that the agency finds infeasible
97
and therefore covertly evades. The purist standards generate huge
amounts of wasted motion. The EPA, states, regulated entities,
environmental advocates, and the courts must dance the dance that
Congress choreographs to make it appear that the legislators have
compromised nothing that any loud interest very much wants. By
shouldering responsibility on how clean is clean enough, Congress
would let the cleanup start sooner and bring the bickering to an end
sooner too. Finally, by shifting the focus from Sunday school
questions (such as whether health objectives should ever be sullied by
concerns about the economy) to more concrete questions (such as
how much to cut a particular kind of pollution), Congress would help

warming_litigation/clean_air_act/pdfs/Petition_GHG_pollution_cap_12-2-2009.pdf.
96. COMM. ON AIR QUALITY MGMT IN THE UNITED STATES ET AL., AIR QUALITY
MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 128 (2004).
97. See Schoenbrod, supra note 18, at 766–79 (discussing how EPA evaded purist
standards of Clean Air Act).

Schoenbrod_122011 (Do Not Delete)

12/22/2011 1:37 PM

Spring 2011] HOW REINS WOULD IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

365

depolarize the polarization that poisons environmental politics.
***
The origin of the rolling, ticking hand grenades is Congress. By failing
to do its job, it improvises explosive devices. REINS would roll the
hand grenades back from whence they came. Returning the grenades
to Congress would help break the logjam and thereby help convert
Congress from terrorist to problem solver.

